Conservatorship Case

In the recent case In Re: Conservatorship of Jack Wayne Turner, the Mother sought modification of a prior court order providing conservatorship of her disabled son to his Father and for modification of the order allowing her only supervised visitation.  After careful consideration of the case as a whole, the trial court ordered that the Mother increased visitation, but upheld the restriction that all visitation be supervised. The trial court too held that the Father had discretion to record any communications between the Mother and their son. The Mother appeals to the Tennessee Court of Appeals arguing the restrictions of the trial court were an unconstitutional restraint on her free speech and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing her only eight hours of supervised visitation per month. The Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court finding that the “modern rule” allowed defamatory speech to be enjoined if it was determined that the statements were false and is allowable only if the injunction is narrowly tailored to prohibit that speech which was determined to be false. They found that the injunction of the trial court satisfied both restrictions. With regard to the issue of the Mother’s supervised visitation, the Tennessee Court of Appeal again upheld the trial court finding that the trial court acted in efforts to preserve the best interest of the parties disabled son by providing safeguards for him against the Mother’s negative actions. They further found that given the Mother’s history of disregarding the orders of the trial court, additional actions were warranted to ensure the court’s orders would be followed. This case is significant as it upholds the acts of the Tennessee Courts to protect those subject to conservatorships from potentially harmful acts of others, even if the means of doing so are highly restrictive. It too furthers the already well-established emphasis on the best interest of those subject to conservatorship actions.  

Department of Homeland Security: Immigration

The Department of Homeland Security is currently considering a policy change that would limit deportation of undocumented immigrants who may have repeat immigration violations but little or no criminal record.

United States Supreme Court

On April 7, 2014, the United States Supreme Court declined to hear arguments over businesses refusing service to gay and lesbian customers. The appeal originated by a photography studio which refused to provide service to a lesbian couple. The decline to hear the case upholds the ruling of the appellate court finding that the studio discriminated against the couple under state law.

Steve Dickerson et al. v. Regions Bank et al.

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this action on February 17, 2009, to quiet title to property they own in Williamson County, Tennessee. At issue was a Deed of Trust that secured a 1997 promissory note, with an original maturity date in 1998, executed by a South Carolina limited liability company of which the plaintiff husband was a member. Plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that the statute of limitations for the 1997 note and deed of trust had lapsed; therefore, the deed of trust encumbering their property should be released. Defendant Beta, LLC, filed a counterclaim for judicial foreclosure asserting it was the assignee of an October 8, 1998 renewal note with a maturity date of October 1999, the maturity date of which was subsequently extended to October 2000 pursuant to a Change in Terms Agreement executed in October 1999. 

It is based on the Change in Terms Agreement that Beta insists the statute of limitations had not lapsed and it is entitled to enforce the deed of trust. Although Beta was unable to produce an original or photocopy of an October 1998 renewal promissory note or evidence that complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-8-101 to prove it was a lost negotiable instrument, the trial court held that a copy of the 1999 Change of Terms Agreement was sufficient to established the existence of the October 1998 renewal note and the extension of the maturity date to 2000; thus the statute of limitations had not run and Beta was vested with the right to enforce the deed of trust. Therefore, the court dismissed Plaintiffs complaint to quiet title and ruled in favor of Beta on the issue of foreclosure. On appeal Plaintiffs contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s rulings. Particularly, Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding that the Change in Terms Agreement dated October 8, 1999, was sufficient to establish Beta’s claims under an October 1998 promissory note of which there is no copy. We have determined the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy Beta’s burden of proof as the foreclosing party. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the specific relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this action on February 17, 2009, to quiet title to property they own in Williamson County, Tennessee. At issue was a Deed of Trust that secured a 1997 promissory note, with an original maturity date in 1998, executed by a South Carolina limited liability company of which the plaintiff husband was a member. Plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that the statute of limitations for the 1997 note and deed of trust had lapsed; therefore, the deed of trust encumbering their property should be released. Defendant Beta, LLC, filed a counterclaim for judicial foreclosure asserting it was the assignee of an October 8, 1998 renewal note with a maturity date of October 1999, the maturity date of which was subsequently extended to October 2000 pursuant to a Change in Terms Agreement executed in October 1999. It is based on the Change in Terms Agreement that Beta insists the statute of limitations had not lapsed and it is entitled to enforce the deed of trust. Although Beta was unable to produce an original or photocopy of an October 1998 renewal promissory note or evidence that complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-8-101 to prove it was a lost negotiable instrument, the trial court held that a copy of the 1999 Change of Terms Agreement was sufficient to established the existence of the October 1998 renewal note and the extension of the maturity date to 2000; thus the statute of limitations had not run and Beta was vested with the right to enforce the deed of trust. Therefore, the court dismissed Plaintiffs complaint to quiet title and ruled in favor of Beta on the issue of foreclosure. 

On appeal Plaintiffs contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s rulings. Particularly, Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding that the Change in Terms Agreement dated October 8, 1999, was sufficient to establish Beta’s claims under an October 1998 promissory note of which there is no copy. We have determined the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy Beta’s burden of proof as the foreclosing party. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the specific relief to

which Plaintiffs may be entitled.
Read more here.

Pseudoephedrine Purchases and Methamphetamine

The Senate Judiciary Committee recently passed Governor Bill Haslam’s plan to battle the growing issue of methamphetamine use and addiction in Tennessee by limiting the purchase of pseudoephedrine to two twenty table boxes per month with a cap of six boxes annually. The fight here continues as many in the House and Senate push for pseudoephedrine to be available only by prescription. Pseudoephedrine is primary ingredient for the manufacture of methamphetamine and an active ingredient in many cold and allergy medications.

Tennessee General Assembly Considers Bill

The Tennessee General Assembly is considering Senate Bill 2495 (House Bill 2445) which would authorize the production, sale, possession and research of industrial hemp.  This bill defines "industrial hemp" as the plants and plant parts of the genera cannabis that do not contain a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration more than three tenths of one percent on a dry mass basis, grown from certified seed. This bill requires the department of agriculture to regulate the farming of industrial hemp through a system of licensure and rules. Any person who grows industrial hemp without a license will be subject to prosecution in the same manner as a person who is growing marijuana. This bill specifically excludes industrial hemp from the definitions of illegal cannabis and schedule VI controlled substances. This bill also includes industrial hemp as a farm product under the Right to Farm Act, which means industrial hemp operations will be presumed to not be a nuisance under such Act.

Ray Hansen, content specialist, AgMRC, Iowa State University provided an “industrial hemp profile” which provides a thorough history of industrial hemp, including its production in the United States and an explanation of the differences between industrial hemp and marijuana.  The Profile was updated August 2012 by Malinda Geisler, AgMRC, Iowa State University. 

To view it, click here.

Keep an eye on Senate Bill 2495 (House Bill 2445). 

Office of the Attorney General: Farm Truck

On March 12, 2014, The State of Tennessee, Office of the Attorney General, issued opinion No. 14-30 which addresses the question, “When a farmer contracts to raise, produce, or feed poultry for the owner of the poultry, is a truck used to transport poultry from the farm pursuant to the contract between the farmer and the owner of the poultry a “farm truck” for purposes of weight restrictions on State highways (not including interstates).  Although the provision’s definition of farm truck did not specifically mention the transportation of poultry, the Attorney General reasoned that since the provision includes “livestock…or other agricultural products”, it was the intention of the General Assembly to include poultry.  Thus, trucks carrying poultry to market by a farmer under contract to the owner of the poultry shall be considered a “farm truck”.

You can now rest easy.  I can’t say the same for the chickens. Read more here.